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AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL TELEOLOGY.¹

A work lately published under the title noted below deserves more than a passing notice in these pages, because it is central in the "stream of tendency." A paraphrase of its title may render its purpose more explicit; it is a study of the "origin and development of the reformer's conscience," or "of the sense of social responsibility"; its sub-title runs, "The Relation between the Establishment of Christianity in Europe and the Social Question." One of the notable signs of our times is a reaching out for some "new religion" on the part of certain leaders of the social movement—a growing conviction that a religious motive or sanction is essential to the success of their propaganda. Parallel with this and yet more significant is the sympathetic attitude of the churches toward the working class—the keen interest taken in its problems and the efforts for its welfare made by eminent religious leaders. Of this fresh responsiveness the work under review is a striking manifestation.

The press-work of the book is admirable. A careful reading reveals very few examples of oversight or haste in proof-correcting, and these chiefly in proper names, as, *e. g.*, the misspellings "Leckey," "Trendelenbury," "Schleiemacher." The author has modestly placed his table of references to his authorities at the back of the volume; we are grateful to him for not pedantically impressing us with it (as some would have done) at the outset, or impeding the course of our reading with numberless foot-notes. We may hope and believe that the fashion of display of sources affected now-a-days by mimics of foreign models will not make much way among us. Every tyro in research knows how easy it is to pile up a list of references to a shelfful of books in the course of a morning's study; to publish it is certainly

¹ *Genesis of the Social Conscience*, by H. S. Nash. The Macmillan Company, 1897.

pedantry—if that be defined as unnecessary display of learning; scholars do not need it, others do not want it—in either case it is superfluous. In the present instance it would be an easy matter to extract the bulk of the authorities from the volume itself; Professor Nash has obviated this by casting them into a table at the end. A rough classification of them may be of interest; they reveal encyclopædic erudition in several languages. Among the ancients and, first, of writers in Greek we have Aristotle, Polybius, Plutarch, Epictetus, and Plotinus; of Latin writers, Cicero, Seneca, Ulpian. Most of the prominent Christian Fathers are mentioned: Hermas, Tatian, Hippolytus, Clement, Eusebius, Chrysostom; Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory the Great—and of the schoolmen, Aquinas. Of modern writers and, first, in English we have Hooker, Burke, Tom Paine, Bagehot, Lewes, J. R. Green, Sir Henry Maine, Lightfoot, Martineau, Bosanquet; in French, Rousseau, Quesnay, Guizot, Quinet, De Tocqueville, Montalembert, Janet, Coulanges, Renan, Baudrillart; in German, Kant, Fichte, Uhlhorn, Baur, Zeller, Lange, Paulsen, Harnack, Wundt and Windelband. This list will serve to make plain the discursive character of the book. We note with surprise the omission of any reference to Schæffle and Laveleye; this might be taken to signify that the treatise was purely historical—yet references to present conditions are scattered up and down in it.

One regrets to note the lingering use of the French word, “*Renaissance*.” Professor Nash is apparently resolved to be the last to lay the old aside: he should have dropped the *i* from the word and substituted *œ* for *sa*. It has come to pass as Matthew Arnold predicted: men are thinking, talking, writing and finding out more and more about the fascinating movement for which he suggested the perfectly satisfactory English term, *Renascence*. Its use, now, happily, rapidly becoming general, will spare our ears many saddening efforts to flex stubborn Saxon tongues to the refinements of

French pronunciation—usually resulting in the phonetic enormity, “rennysawnce.” Further, according to the canon of pure diction, foreign terms should be abjured in favor of native equivalents; and finally, the use of its French appellation obscures the practical and present, personal and domestic significance of the movement in question.

An historical inaccuracy (easily explicable through a common confusion in the ordinals of centuries) is the misplacing of Proclus the Neoplatonist in the fourth century (p. 106); he belongs in the fifth.

Touching matters of style, the most noticeable and all-controlling characteristic of the book is originality even to eccentricity: vocabulary, sentence structure, figures of speech are all marked by it. In the first paragraph, for example, one is struck by the strange term, “geologian,” certainly not in good use; and the author perpetrates verbal coinages such as “downmost,” which he repeats to tedium, although a choice of good terms—“lowermost,” “undermost,” was ready to his hand. A pontifical air is given to some passages by the use of archaic, biblical terms, “yea,” “hath,” “unto,” (connected with this one notes that the little word “I” occurs seven times in the second paragraph); to others a familiar tone is given by contractions such as “there’s,” and “don’t.” A common rhetorical blemish recurs with astonishing frequency—“to ceaselessly widen,” “to perceptibly lengthen,” “to permanently bind;” these examples, taken at random, are sufficient to impress one with the cumbrousness and inelegance of that locution. The sentences are commonly short, and hence the style has an abrupt effect corresponding to abrupt turns of thought. Only too rarely does one discover an example of beautiful and melodious phrasing like the following (p. 36)—perhaps the most beautiful sentence in the work: “Sidney’s surrender of the cup of cold water on the battlefield enables us to forget for a while the hideousness of war, and find peace in the loveliness of the deed, as if history had already reached the divine, far off event towards which she slowly labors, and as if the pain of waiting for the perfect were ended.”

The most striking and often highly amusing feature of the style is its figurativeness. Herein the author's psychology is revealed: his style is the product of a fusion of thought and imagination so thorough that the two elements are almost indistinguishable; it seems as if he could not think except in figures. The work is throughout a blend of philosophy and poetry; the idea is not clarified and crystalized; instead we find a transcendental, Emersonian suggestiveness.

Let us illustrate this combination of thought, fancy and humor by a few random specimens. From the Germans our author has borrowed a figure quaint to grotesqueness, yet telling (p. 11): "In pouring out the bathing-water of individualism we may possibly spill out the baby,—Individuality." Another version of this idea occurs on page 81: "Spinoza sweeps out the jewel with the dust." "The Robinsonade has become an extinct type of literature — there must be a sweetheart on the other end of the island." "A caucus at the back side of the moon is a part of no man's programme." "The meadow that slopes to the sea confesses its parochial mind." "Homer made a very poor Bible for a Puritan, even after allegory had done its best to provide exegetical rose-water." "If one could get a Calvinist and a satyr to agree to make one man, that man would be Cellini." "Hell is conscience in colors." In the table of contents itself this sportive idiosyncrasy breaks out; "the Isolation of the Moral Ideal in the Monastery, raised the Man without a Grandfather to the Spiritual Peerage."

Turning now to weightier matters; the postulate of the work is that there is a discernible purpose in human history—and that that is, according to the theistic, optimistic, ideal, Hegelian view, the freedom and moralization of the individual. The antithesis to this would be, of course, the fatalistic, pessimistic, agnostic, Schopenhauerian view according to which history is resolved into a kind of weather—and weather never to be explained by any sort of historical meteorology—into blind chance or non-moral necessity involving the complete bondage of the individual.

It is well to have the alternatives clearly presented, for history is destined to become the theatre of future discussion, the battlefield of the mind; all manner of questions, religious, political, literary, aesthetic—questions of biblical and ecclesiastical authority, of social and individual rights—are bound to be carried eventually to the bar of history, that is, the experience of the race; and it is evident that the latter view would practically exclude such appeal. “If, however, it be possible to find a clear thread of purpose running through the time process, be it ever so slight, History itself becomes a drama,” and the social question, which might otherwise “appear to be sprung upon our time by economic changes, is seen to be the last chapter hitherto in the history of the Occidental view of the Universe” (pp. 1, 5f). “It is a fair inference that the history of the social question is in organic connection with the history of the idea [of God, *i. e.*,] which has recorded the noblest ventures of the heart and registered its most enduring gains” (p. 14). “Universal history sinks to a physical process unless the individualization of the downmost man be set as its goal. . . . History cannot remain a moral process unless the downmost man become individual. . . . The most ardent socialist would surely go into bankruptcy, if he were not convinced that his cause has roots as deep as history; for if the social question is a patch on history, he must be a patch on society” (pp. 17, 62, 105).

It remains to trace the working out of our author's argument from design in history,—his social teleology. He seeks his point of departure in primitive, prehistoric conditions, taking as his starting-point the Tribe—“the first fighting machine invented by man,” by means of which “our race won its first great victories over Nature.” The tribe thus forms the dim background of history; it was a first and necessary stage in human life; and for the due fulfilment of its function the individual within it could have no liberty, no rights, but had to be completely subordinated

to the common need. "The Tribe was a mass of humanity, not an organic union of developed individuals." There was no relation save one of antagonism between the members of different tribes, "neither was there any individual as such, inside the Tribe. The old people and the sickly had no rights. Infants brought into the world no value of their own."

We pause here a moment to illustrate the sketchy, suggestive method of treatment of the book, the incompleteness of the analysis: the bondage of tribal woman is not mentioned. It is true that infanticide was common—that children were their father's property—that the aged were not respected but, together with the sick and infirm, were abandoned or otherwise put out of the way—and as a corollary of all this, wives were their husbands' slaves. And indeed what consideration could induce a fighting machine to spare its weak and superannuated members? They would simply be encumbrances in the struggle for existence.

The tie that bound men in a tribal unit was the tie of blood and religion. "Religion, although it could never have been exhausted in ancestor worship, was very largely that," and this religious mortmain held the tribal family as in a vice, prohibiting progress or any change, canonizing ancient custom, denying the present and the individual reason any right, any authority. In India "the tribal ideal, thanks to the environment, hardened into the caste system. The existing frame of society was eternized."

"We can easily see that, if there is ever to be a social question, the individual must be set free from the overmastering grip of the tribal society, and that the present must be emancipated from the tyrannous pressure of the Past"—that, in a word, the cast of the mere fighting machine, its use over, must be broken. "When the cake of habit breaks up, when the Tribe ceases to be the unit, and a man by himself begins to count for one, mental difficulty and its attendant wonder arise. . . . The clarification of self-

consciousness undoes the tribal aristocracy, and this helps to define the elemental man and create a new unit for sociology." The scene of this mental and social crisis—a movement unsurpassed in history for fresh and vivid interest—was the eastern basin of the Mediterranean or, more narrowly, the shores and islands of the Ægean sea, and the time, the seventh century before our era. "In the Mediterranean world, for the first time in history, the individual man was clearly defined. . . . Greece was the home of individuality. . . . Greece was the land where the magic word "Freedom" began its career. . . . Greece worked out the logic of thought. The great colonial movement of the eighth and seventh centuries B. C., the habits of adventure and travel, the restless curiosity that discovered a frontier of experience only to go beyond it, the jostle and collision of local customs, the destructive result of criticism, and the constructive research for the common elements which it made necessary—all these manifold forces brought the Greek mind to the declaration of Socrates that he was a citizen of the world. . . . The widening of the outer world and the deepening of the inner went on together. . . . What Athens, representing Greece, contributed to the campaign against caste was: culture." Philosophy, democracy and science were born in Greece, and grew side by side. The long process of Greek philosophy, political, ethical and natural, issued in the Stoic definition of the universal, cosmopolitan man. In theory equality was won—but power was lacking "to drive the definition home." Throughout Greek history survivals of the old tribal state are plainly visible, and at its close we find an excellent philosophic theory of equal rights for all co-existing with the greatest practical inequalities. Ancient society was based on slavery. "In Aristotle's theory of life, leisure, the mother of culture, must be supported by slaves. . . . A new and far nobler aristocracy, an aristocracy of mind, had driven out the old. It was, however, a downright aristocracy, and took up a strongly sceptical attitude towards

the spiritual capacity of the masses. . . . The philosophic ethic of antiquity lacked the dynamic, the creative, the missionary elements." And so the problem was bequeathed by Greece to Rome.

As the virtue of Greece was in philosophy and culture, so that of Rome was in law. The internal history of Rome was for ages a controversy between two views of law, "a debate between the interests of one class of men, interests which had fortified themselves on the high ground of a sacred past, and so restrained the idea of rights within their own camp, and the interests of a later age and of a different class. . . . When the Ten Tables were published at Rome, it signified that law was to be thenceforward the property of all, no longer the privilege of a few. . . . The thought of a man-made law, as distinct from sacred custom, carried under its heart the belief in the constitutionality of the permanent desires of the lowest classes." The movement of Roman Law was toward an increasing recognition of individual rights, until at length, in the early years of the empire, it was fully prepared to respond to an impulse from Greek philosophy which powerfully accelerated that tendency. "The subject of Stoicism opens straight into the inner life of the Roman Empire, for neither could Stoicism without the Empire have become the great force it was; nor could the Empire without Stoicism have understood itself in terms of law. . . . Stoicism and the Empire join hands. The deepening sense of humanity penetrates the law. The result is the dogma of equality. As far as natural law is concerned, all men are equal. Slavery is against Nature, for freedom is the birthright of man."

By the alliance thus concluded between Greek philosophy and Roman law, an intellectual ideal wins efficacy in the sphere of practical life; the weakness of thought is reinforced by the power and majesty of law. "The reasoned cosmopolitanism of Greek philosophy now gets the support without which the mightiest conception is unable to make its fortune—the support of circumstance." And yet this

union, that promised so much, was powerless to effect the moralization of the individual and the regeneration of society. We need only recall the horrors of the gladiatorial shows and the fact that the agricultural and industrial life of the empire was based ever more and more broadly upon slavery. The contrasts of social life, the insensate luxury of the rich, the debasement and squalor of the poor, beggar description. Philosophy and law together were unable to overcome the prejudice of caste. The Stoics 'were at best, half-hearted in their estimate of the common man.

. . . Rome with all her greatness could not outgrow the tribal principle. . . . The apotheosis of the Emperors . . . was a reversion on a vast scale to the tribal religion. The solidarity between the deified Pontifex Maximus and the primitive Priest-King is beyond all doubt. Thus . . . the worship of the Emperor undid the definition of equality that the logic of the Empire demanded."

"As regards the social question, the Greek and the Roman would have been helpless to level the road for it, unless the Semite had come to their aid, organizing and insuring their gains by means of his idea of God." A religious motive, that is, was absolutely necessary to give efficacy to a philosophic concept and a legal postulate. "Israel first presented to the mind the thought of a moral goal for history—a thought foreign to heathendom. . . . Herein is found the mighty difference between metaphysical and prophetic monotheism. The philosophic monotheism of Greece looks away from history and society. . . . But for prophetic monotheism history is not thought away; it is put in the hand of a Holy Will, and thus becomes the abiding material of conduct. . . . The process by which this monotheistic idea was given to men was worked out through the use and growth of a new type of statesmen—the prophets. . . . They might be chosen from any rank. In some cases they were literally men of the people. . . . In all cases they were men for the people." The cardinal points of their preaching were sin, judg-

ment, and redemption—the apostasy of the nation, its punishment by physical and moral forces, and the recovery of a righteous remnant through a great deliverer. “The sense of sin” was “fundamental in the prophetic economy,” and ‘the thought of sin, pressed home, is an attack upon the aristocratic principle . . . The out-and-out teleologic character of Old Testament religion . . . means that a divine purpose hides within the social present, . . . that the other world is just a storehouse of possibilities which shall some day enter history with reforming power . . . The religion of the Old Testament and the democratic view of things, however they differ as to ways and means, . . do yet in fact have the same sky-line . . . And so the success that crowned the attempt to popularize monotheism was one of the great steps taken by history towards Democracy.”

“Greek, Roman, and Jew built the highway over which Christianity marched to conquest. . . . This Biblical organism of ideas took flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. We count the nation happy that has a hero, because in him it sees embodied the deepest tendencies of its past as well as the clearest prophecies of its future, so that through him it knows itself and finds itself. From the point of view of the social question, the Christ is the Hero of Humanity. . . . Viewed as the synonym of God, He is always seen in the society of the outcast and the downtrodden. . . . Here or nowhere is the Supreme Good. And the footsteps of the Supreme Good in time and space lead from the celestial commonness of the carpenter’s shop at Nazareth to the redeeming death on Calvary.”

The community that the Christ founded was “a kingdom not of this world” in the sense that it “disowned the world’s favorite argument, the sword, putting the cross in its place.” It brought over from the Jewish church “the dogma that the poor are God’s own folk . . . Thus did the market value of the common man rise vastly.” Like its Jewish predecessor, the Christian church was totally separate from

any civil power; our author puts a high estimate upon the value of this separation: "The State, in the largest and deepest form that antiquity could give to it, was not equal to the task of housing the universal individual. Therefore, the separation of Church and State aiming, as it does, to furnish the supply to this demand, may fairly be called the ethical climax of antiquity . . . The larger house built for itself by the universal individual was the Christian Church . . . The Church separated from the State, and housing the outstanding individual, capitalized the gains of Greece and Rome while indefinitely increasing them by means of an aggressive monotheism." It took, that is, the finest principle of Greek philosophy and Roman law, and gave it motive-power through a Semitic religious fervor. In this period "ethical theory and religious experience stored up values in the common man to such an extent that he must needs become a person,—an end in himself, and cease to be a thing,—a means to the development of personality in other men."

In the second century of our era the tendency of thought throughout the empire was all in the direction of dualism, which "means that the world in time and space is not wholly material for the redeeming will and can never become such," and "that man can be saved only by abandoning some part of his equipment. The part abandoned is sure to be the body." The bearing of dualism upon the subject in hand is that thus "the civic world, the laborer's world, loses its sacredness." A powerful and persistent effort was made to establish dualism within Christianity: "the gnostics would have turned the Church into a spiritual club. They stratified humanity. There are souls to whom the deepest truth belongs by right, but the mass of men have no claim to the highest." The church repudiated the aristocratic spiritualism of the Gnostics—their system of religious caste: "according to Christianity, the possibility of highest manhood is pent up within the downtrodden and the brutalized. . . . The presence of an immortal 'soul' in every man gave him in theory a transcendent value."

Unlike the Stoics, "the Christians were whole-hearted . . . in their estimate of the common man. . . . Adversaries like Celsus reproached them for trying to make free spirits out of common clay. . . . Amongst the multitude of inscriptions from the catacombs not one has yet been found that records the burial of a slave or a freedman, although beyond doubt a large part of those whose bodies were buried there belonged to one or the other of those classes. The Christian slave was buried not as a slave, but as a man."

"Baptism was one and the same for all men. It was the pledge of spiritual equality. The Lord's Supper provided one bread for all. . . . The poor were supposed to be of very high price in the estimate of God," and offerings for them became "an integral part of the Eucharistic service. . . . The Christian foundations and endowments . . . looked to all mankind."

By the fourth century the supreme need of humanity had come to be a definition of man, an estimate of the worth of the common man, that should transcend all current political and social definitions and estimates, and "a driving power that should force the definition down through the lowest stratum of society." (This last is a favorite phrase of the author's: he repeats and repeats it again, pp. 3, 106, 126). "The heathen state was unequal to those labors," and accordingly passed them over to the Church. . . . Only a religion possessing entire certitude and claiming absolute verity could answer the second demand of antiquity"—*i. e.*, for 'a driving power.' "The establishment of Christianity in Europe creates the Reformer's Conscience . . . gave to men the thought of a moral goal for history. . . . gave a great lift to the market value of the common man. This shows itself in the new value set on human life. The exposure of children and abortion were common heathen practices. The Church treated them both as murder. Suicide was invested with romantic interest. . . . The Church . . . accounted [it] a deadly sin. Again, the Church set her face like a flint against the gladiatorial games."

At this point, the crisis of his argument, Professor Nash loses a brilliant opportunity, commits a serious error, by ignoring the humane legislation of Constantine. This is just what was needed to point his moral, to prove his thesis, to put the cope-stone upon the structure of his logic—which its omission weakens badly. It may be suspected that his high estimate of the temporary value of a separation of church and state blinds him to the benefits of an establishment. The philanthropic strain in Constantine's legislation was the happiest social result of the union of church and state which he accomplished. In its recognition of claims not before regarded, its effort to protect the weak and hapless, it reflected the spirit of Christianity in contrast to the principle of caste so deeply imbedded in ancient law. Women were protected by restrictions placed upon divorce; infanticide was forbidden; slaves were not to be branded on the face as a punishment, and married slaves were not to be separated. This benevolent solicitude was extended even "to the lowest stratum of society"; light and air were to be let into the fetid prisons, and criminals of both sexes were no longer to be herded together but to be confined in separate apartments. Crucifixion was abolished, and gladiatorial shows were suppressed, except in Italy, throughout the empire: the emperor's new capital, Constantinople, was never stained by them.

Here we might close. The impact of Christianity, with its doctrine of the transcendent value of the single soul, upon ancient society engendered the reformer's conscience, began the long, long struggle for social amelioration. "The genesis of the social conscience" has been expounded; this is the gist of the argument, as set forth in the first four chapters or lectures, the first half of the book. The last half really forms a second part, which might with propriety be designated (as suggested at the outset) "the development, or growth, of the social, or reformer's, conscience."

Even from the Arian controversy Professor Nash ex-

torts a contribution to social progress. "The democratic ideal . . . has a very real interest in the debate between Athanasius and Arius over the iota. . . The dogma of the Incarnation . . . affirmed that there is nothing in God which may not come into relation with mankind. It was all in the interest of the common man." And soon thereafter, when with Augustine "psychology assumes the primacy in philosophy, and when the will acquires the primacy in psychology, a most significant step has been taken," for then at last the ideas of Personality and Duty enter the Western mind, and the sense of sin, "a great leveller," becomes instinctive.

During the lifetime of Augustine monasticism was established in Western Europe. It was induced in part by the increasing secularization of the church, but in its deepest aspect it was a retreat from the outer to the inner world, "the isolation of the moral ideal." It was based upon the conviction of an infinite worth in the common man. One might say, employing a favorite term of our author, that it "capitalized" and conserved the gains of established Christianity. The fifth and sixth chapters or lectures—the third quarter of the book—are largely concerned with the ideal drill of the individual that went on within the monastery walls. Liberty, equality and fraternity formed the monastic programme; the author takes some pains to explain the apparent paradox involved in the first term: the vow of obedience ensured freedom, was essential to the success, the existence even, of the ideal. One might add that the other vows liberated the individual from social entanglements. Equality and fraternity were of course perfectly realized: within the convent there was no difference between a serf's and a king's son. Labor was required as essential to perfection; 'the axes of the monks, who made so many broad clearings in the forests of Europe, ring in unison with the axe of the "American pioneer." Within the cloister literature survived the struggle for subsistence through ages of barbarism, rude luxury, and general indifference to learning; there only

could a tradition of culture be preserved. Professor Nash thinks that but for monasticism the church could not have escaped feudalization and consequent corruption of her democratic principle. American scholarship has, happily, left so far behind the ignorant contempt once affected for the monks and the Middle Ages that one need scarcely remark the intelligent sympathy with which our author handles this part of his subject. All the more remarkable, therefore, is the absence of any reference to the wonderful work of Francis of Assisi and the friars.

In the sixteenth century the monk emerged from his cloister, reared a family and took to politics. "The sum of the whole matter is that the individual, fashioned by the combined influences of the Graeco-Roman Empire and the Bible, drilled in the Monastery, called forth from the Monastery by a revival of religion and culture on the one hand and by the growing power of the State on the other, stood free in the open field of history. . . . Protestantism put the Bible in the common layman's hand. . . . The Crown's control of matters ecclesiastical stood for the declaration that the laity were now come of age in the kingdom of God."

After consideration of the levelling power of Puritanism, we pass on, in the eighth and closing chapter, to the eighteenth century: to Rousseau with his religion of enthusiasm for the common man and his theory of a social contract, (which implies a right to criticise every existing form of government)—to Kant, the Copernicus of philosophy and a genuine democrat. In that century the individual shook himself free from all precedent, all convention, and sought to build for himself a larger house.

In our day the forces that favor a new and better social settlement are democracy, the national idea (involving a more spiritual conception of the State), the category of relation in philosophy, natural science, with its immanent view of life, the doctrine of evolution, giving new and hopeful meaning to the idea of change, modern education, which re-

gards the individual as an end in himself. "The missionary forces of society are striving to create individuals in places where now there is a mere gross lump of humanity . . . Only so far as the social movement is in partnership with them, does it have the power of permanent appeal . . . It is a reformation that we need, not a revolution." We need "to know that the hope of a nobler culture for the world is bound up with the draining of the slums," in the existence of which "a city, self-consciously democratic, has its whole creed at stake."

"The social movement draws all its power from reverence for humanity . . . Hence it has religion implicit in itself, . . . and, on the other side, the religious feeling is essentially social . . . It is fast becoming a matter of common remark that the deeper socialism of England and America is looking towards, if it has not already entered into, a religious phase . . . The Christian view of the universe, as it is embodied in the person of Christ, is alone able to endow the principle of individuality with sovereign authority in history."

Such is the substance of this striking essay. It is full of learning, of "nuggets of thought"; it is a veritable mine of information, of quotable sentences; it coruscates with suggestion, opening wide horizons, flashing upon the inward eye long vistas of thought. It is a brilliant illustration of the sort of work that is being done by the younger, the rising school of American scholarship. We are glad to note, during the writing of these lines, that it is about to pass into a second edition,—an encouraging fact, in that it witnesses to the general interest taken in the subject with which it deals: an interest stimulated a few years ago by Mr. Benjamin Kidd's "*Social Evolution*," and extended by Mrs. Humphry Ward in her "*Marcella*"—a feminine embodiment of "the social conscience." Professor Nash's is, without doubt, the most original contribution to the discussion yet made by an American. While the differences between them are patent, something in its freshness and

breadth of treatment constantly reminds one of Mr. Kidd's book, and the thesis of both is the same,—that a religious motive is necessary to social progress. Professor Nash makes good his point, that religion has been, all along, the basis of social history, and that religion only, and among religions Christianity only, supplies an adequate definition of man and furnishes the will with power to make it effective. Christianity is, in a word, the synthesis of the ideal and the power to realize it.

It is certainly a question whether our modern industrial system, which regards man as a laboring, money-making machine, is any improvement, morally, upon that ancient tribal system in which he was regarded as a fighting-machine. What consideration has it to spare for women and children, the sick, infirm and old,—inferior producers, or temporarily incapacitated, or past the time of production? Such will be simply industrial slaves or encumbrances. When will the state of war, military and industrial, for blood and gold,—when will the barbarity of caste come to an end, and Personality be universally recognized? No recourse need be had to economic society: our modern plutocratic aristocracy is powerless to furnish a solution. The shuddering interest in the problem and much of the charity of the hour are motivated by FEAR. "Eleemosynary relief," it has been said, "never satisfied, never won the gratitude of the working classes." The spirit that surrenders a little that it may secure more is speedily detected and recompensed with contempt and violence. Christianity holds the key of the social question; it alone esteems the poor duly and supplies a motive that will stand every test; it alone can carry healing into slums and crowded factories and waste places of the earth.

GREENOUGH WHITE.